In this paper, we present a new framework to verify cryptographic protocols statically for the property of confidentiality using the witness-functions. A witness-function is a reliable metric able to prove confidentiality in a cryptographic protocol by measuring security in it. Here, we present the theory of witness-functions and we run an analysis on the flawed version of the Woo-Lam protocol using one of these metrics.
Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are short programs intended to ensure some security properties in communications using cryptographic primitives. Designing a secure protocol is a hard problem [1] - [8] . In fact, many security bugs have been uncovered in lots protocols too many years after of their use [9] - [14] . The man-in-the-middle attack is one of them. It is therefore crucial to obtain a formal token that a protocol is secure for the properties that it must ensure. For that, many verification methods had been introduced to analyze security inside protocols [15] - [27] . In this paper we pose a new static framework for measuring security in protocols that we instilled recently in [28] - [32] using the witness-functions. A witness-function is a mathematical function built locally in the protocol. It could be used to observe the evolution of every atomic message in order to verify that its level of security never falls down in all protocol steps. If a protocol is designed that way, we can conclude that it is secure with respect to confidentiality. A witness-function bases its calculation fully on the static part of a message (static neighborhood) in a role-based specification [26] , [33] , [34] and ignores the dynamic one (dynamic neighborhood) by construction. It provides two elegant and practical bounds that enable to analyze a protocol on an unbounded number of sessions and with no restriction on the size of valid traces. Here we give the theoretical foundation of the witness-functions and we run an analysis on the flawed version of the Woo-Lam protocol using one of them. We show that it can help to describe the flaw in it.
A Stable-by-Intruder verification Function ' is such that, when it assigns a security level to an atom _ in a set of messages Μ the intruder can never derive, using her knowledge, from Μ another message in which this level drops (i.e. ( , ) ⋣ ( , )), unless is initially intended to the intruder (i.e. ⌈ ⌉( ) ⊒ ⌈ ⌉).
Definition 2.3, [Reliable Verification Function]:
Let be a verification function and C be a context of verification.
is C-reliable, if { is well formed in is stabled by intruder in A reliable verification function is stable-by-intruder and well-formed.
Definition 2.4, [ -Increasing Protocol]:
Let be a verification function, C be a context of verification and be a protocol, is -Increasing in if ∀ . ∈ ( )∀ℴ ∈ : ⟶ ℳ we have:
A -Increasing protocol is a protocol that produces immutably valid traces with atoms having all the time a level of security, assessed by , higher on sending (i.e. in + ), than it was on reception (i.e. in − ).
Definition 2.5, [Secret Divulgation]:
Let be a protocol and C be a context of verification. We say that reveals a secret ∈ (ℳ) in C if:
A secret divulgation is the fact that the intruder manipulates a valid trace ϱ, using her capacity, to derive a secret α that she should not know (i.e. ⌈ ( )⌉ ⋣ ⌈ ⌉).
Proposition 2.6:
Let be a C-Reliable verification function and a -Increasing Protocol. We have:
The Proposition 2.6 asserts that the level of security of an atom α in a message m generated by an increasing protocol and assessed by a reliable verification function is maintained higher than its initial value in the context, if the atom is not initially destined to the intruder. Indeed, initially the atom has a given level of security. This level cannot be decreased by the intruder using her capacity and received messages because a reliable function is Stable-by-Intruder. Besides, in every new step of the evolution of the valid trace, involved atoms have higher level of security assessed by since the protocol is -increasing. The proof is then directed by induction on the size of the trace.
Theorem 2.7, [Security of Increasing Protocols]:
Let be a C -Reliable verification Function and a -increasing protocol. is C -secure with respect to confidentiality. The Theorem 2.7 states that an increasing protocol is secure with respect to confidentiality when analyzed with a reliable function . The proof of the Theorem 2.7 derives directly from the Proposition 6 and the Definitions 2.1 and 2.5. For further details on the proof, please see [28] - [32] .
Reliable Verification Functions
We define in [29] , [32] a class of reliable selection-based verification functions. A selection ∈ returns for an atom in a message : 1) If α is encrypted by a key , where k is the most external key that satisfies to ⌈ −1 ⌉ ⊒ ⌈ ⌉(or simply the external protective key), a subset among the reverse form −1 and atoms that travel with under the same protection by k ( itself is not selected); 2) For two messages joined by an operation other than an encryption by a protective key (e.g. pair), the union of two subselections in the two messages separately; 3) If does not have a protective key in m, the infimum value (all atoms); 4) If does not appear in m, the supremum value (the empty set). We prove that any ∈ is C -reliable.
Among the elements of , we define three practical selections:
1) The selection : returns for an atom in a message having the key as an external protective, all the principal identities inside the same protection by , in addition to the key −1 ;
2) The selection : returns for an atomαin a message m having as an external protective key , the key −1 ;
3) The selection : returns for an atom in a message m having as an external protective key , all the principal identities inside the same protection by ; These selections when composed to a proper homomorphism ψ render reliable verification functions φ = ψ ο S.
We choose the homomorphism that returns for: 1) A principal, its identity;
2) The key −1 , if selected, the set of principals that know it in the context.
We denote by , and respectively the compositions , and . We
International Journal of Computer and Communication Engineering
prove that these functions are C-reliable. The main idea of the proof is that the selection for protected atoms (secrets) is always performed inside an invariant area protected by the external protective keyk. Hence, to alter this area (to decrease the level of security of an atom ), the intruder should have derived the atomic key −1 before. In this case, her knowledge should necessarily satisfy ⌈ ( )⌉ ⊒ ⌈ −1 ⌉. Since the key
satisfies ⌈ −1 ⌉ ⊒ ⌈ ⌉, then the knowledge of the intruder must satisfy ⌈ ( )⌉ ⊒ ⌈ ⌉ too by transitivity of the relation "⊒" in the lattice, which is the definition of a Stable-by-Intruder function. These functions are in addition Well-Formed by construction. So, they are C-reliable. For further details on the proof, please see [30] - [32] . In the rest of this paper, denotes any of the functions , and .
Example:
Let be an atom, m a message and a key such that ⌈ ⌉ ={A, B, S}, m= {A. C. { ⌈α⌉.
The Witness-Functions
The verification functions defined previously are good to verify a protocol through its valid traces (closed messages). Unfortunately, the set of valid traces is infinite. A static verification should be run on the finite set of generalized roles. But, the generalized roles contain variables and our functions are not ready to deal with this problem. Here, we propose a safe way to use these functions on generalized roles. First, in order to reduce variable effects, we introduce the notion of derivative messages that are messages from which we remove variables as described in the Definition 4.1.
Definition 4.1, [Derivation]:
We define the derivative message as follows:
Then, we apply any of the previous functions to derivative message instead of the message with variables. For an atom of the static part (i.e. in m) we analyze it with no regard to variables at all. For a variable, it is analyzed as a constant block with no regard on its content and with no respect to other variables in the message, if any. Hence, every component is calculated according to the static neighborhood only. This is described by the Definition 4.2. For any secret, a reliable function φ applied to derivative messages preserves its property of reliability since its associative selection might just ignore some candidates (principal identities that come dynamically by variable substitution), but remains a sub-selection of , so reliable Definition 4.2:
Let m ∈ ℳ , X ∈ Xm and mσ be a valid trace.
For all α ∈ A(mσ), σ ∈ Γ, we denote by: 
Therefore,
is not even a function on since it could return more than one image for the same atom .
To solve this problem, we define the witness-functions. A witness-function as described in the Definition 4.4 considers all the sources of a closed message mσ in the finite set of generalized roles and takes the minimum. This minimum naturally exists and is unique in a lattice.
Definition 4.4, [Witness-Function]:
Let ∈
, X Xm and mσ be a valid trace. Let p be a protocol and φ be a C-reliable verification Function. We define a witness-function Φ , for all α  A(mσ), σ  Γ, as follows:
We notice that a witness-function depends on the set of sources of , (i.e. the set{ ′ ∈ ℳ |∃ ′ ∈ Γ, ′ ′ = }). So it depends on the substitution that is not known statically. For that, we bind the witness-function in two bounds that are independent of any substitution in order to be able to verify a protocol statically, with no regard to its runs. These bounds are given by the Proposition 4.5.
Proposition 4.5:
Let ∈ ℳ , let ϕp, φ be a witness-function. For all σ ∈ Γ we have:
The proof of the Proposition 4.5 is trivial since we have always
The upper bound (the tighter) provides a minimal set of confirmed principals whereas the lower bound (the looser) provides the set of all possible principals in all the likely runs of a protocol. This latter contains, in addition to the honest ∀ R, r ∈ ( ), ∀ ( + ) we have:
The proof derives directly from the Proposition 4.5 and the Theorem 2.7. The Theorem 4.6 sets a criterion for protocol growth, so correctness with a witness-function using its bounds. Since these bounds do not depend on substitutions, then we can now, and only now, verify a protocol through its set of generalized roles and extend any conclusion to the traces.
Although, the application given in the Definition 4.2 is naturally independent of any substitution in , using it to verify protocols is an error-prone process. Let us see that in the following example.
Case Study: Verification of the Woo-Lam Protocol (Flawed Version) Using a Witness-Function
In this section, we run an analysis of the flawed version of the Woo-Lam protocol using the witness-function , . The flawed version of the Woo-Lam protocol is denoted by p and defined in Table 1 . .
Verification of the Generalized Role of A
As defined in the generalized role of A, an agent A can participate in some session in which she receives an unknown message X and sends the message { . } . This is described by the following rule: 
Verification of the Generalized Role of
As defined in the generalized roles of , an agent can participate in two consequent sessions: and such that j > i. In the former session , the agent receives the identity A and sends the nonce . In the consequent session , she receives an unknown message and she sends the message { . . } . This is described by the following rules:
2.1. Verification of the messages in the session :
Since is declared public in the context ( . . ⌈ ⌉ = ⊥), then we derive:
Verification of the messages in the session :
Since when receiving, we have: ( , [ ] ) = ( . ) =⊥, then we derive:
2) Compliance with the security criterion in the Theorem 4.6: 
Verification of the Generalized Role of
As defined in the generalized role , an agent can participate in some session in which she receives the message { . { . } } and sends the message { . } . This is described by the following rule: 
Discussion
The verification results of the Woo and Lam protocol are given in Table 2 . From Table 2 , we conclude that this version of the Woo-Lam protocol is not compliant with the security criterion in the Theorem 4.6. For this reason, we cannot make any conclusion concerning its confidentiality. All that we can say is: "If the protocol contains a law, it must be because of one of the security decay in the rows 1, 5 and 6 of Table 2 .
Consistent with this conclusion, in the literature, we report a law in this protocol that exploits the decay of security of the variable in the generalized role of the server S as shown in the row 6 of Table 2 . The attack scenario is described by Table 3 . In fact, the server S may receive a message (the session key ) substituting the variable in the message { . { . } } such that it is protected by only (see (5.3.3.2)), after that he sends it encrypted by the key in the message { . { . } } . This encryption key was not unfortunately enough strong to ensure its confidentiality in that message as shown in the statement (5.3.6.2). Now that we are aware that this protocol involves this flaw, we can conclude by modus-tollens of the Theorem 4.6 that: "There is no hope to find any Witness-Function such that this protocol might be increasing using it". We conjecture that the amended version p' of the Woo-Lam protocol given in Table 4 is secure for confidentiality and we prove this using the witness-functions in a future work. 
Related Works
We compare our method of protocol verification by the witness-functions to the method by Interpretation Functions proposed by Houmani in [35] - [38] and the method by Rank-Functions proposed by Steve Schneider in [39] and the method by typing proposed by Abadi in [25] , [40] , [41] . We believe that our method is more efficient and flexible than Houmani's one, simpler than Schneider's one and less restrictive than Abdi's one. We think that it can be used on wider range of protocols.
Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we presented a new framework for verifying cryptographic protocols statically using the witness-functions for the property of confidentiality. We tested them on the lawed version of the Woo-Lam protocol and we showed that they can even describe laws. In a future work, we intend to extend our witness-functions to authentication. In this respect, we believe that this property could be reached by slightly modifying the criterion set in the Theorem 4.6. 
